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PRABAL KUMAR SEN  
 
This anthology, which contains twelve essays, aims to show that while “classical Indian 
Philosophy simply does not have an overarching debate about free will that neatly 
corresponds to [what is found] within the Western tradition, . . ., concerns surrounding 
the interaction of free will, agency and selfhood are not unimportant in, or negligible 
to, the leading schools of Indian Philosophy” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 1-2).  
 
Problems of Free Will and Agency Across Cultures 
 
The volume's introduction gives a brief but illuminating account of the problems 
concerning free will, agency and selfhood, as well as their importance and relevance in 
Western philosophy, and then states how in the Indian tradition these problems have 
been treated in a somewhat different manner. It also indicates the reasons thereof. The 
first reason is that the notion of free will as developed in the Western tradition can be 
traced back to the writings of St. Augustine, who was trying to solve the problem raised 
by the Biblical story about the Fall of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden for tasting 
the forbidden fruit of knowledge at the instigation of Satan in the form of a serpent. 
Adam, Eve and their future progeny were punished by God for disobeying His 
command. But the Bible also describes God as the omnipotent, omniscient and 
benevolent being who is the cause of all things, and this apparently makes God 
responsible for the ‘original sin’ committed by Adam and Eve; because even though 
He had foreknowledge of such an event, and even though it was possible  ____________________________		
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for Him to prevent it, He did not do so, but instead punished the guilty couple, even 
though He is said to be benevolent and merciful. What makes matters worse is that God 
punished not only Adam and Eve but their entire progeny, even though the latter were 
not yet born, and could in no way commit this ‘original sin’. In order to solve this 
problem, the so-called problem of theodicy was formed where one has to account for 
the co-existence of evil and suffering with the omniscience, omnipotence, and 
benevolence of God. It had to be shown that Adam and Eve were the original causes of 
the actions that had resulted in the original sin, and in order to show this, St. Augustine 
had admitted the faculty of will that was capable of producing actions that can be 
morally evaluated as good or bad actions (all other human behaviors have to be treated 
as natural events that have no moral dimension). Will is the capacity for choosing a 
certain course of action, and one’s will is free when one is able to choose otherwise, or 
in other words, be the proper source of one’s choice, without the intervention of any 
compulsion or coercion. Agency is the capacity for performing actions, as distinguished 
from event causation where no question of conscious choice arises. Actions are what 
someone does while events are phenomena that merely happen. Actions are explained 
in terms of reasons, whereas events are explained in terms of causes. Thus, agency 
invariably presupposes the existence of free will, which makes the agent responsible 
for his/her actions. Determination of will by external causes is thus incompatible with 
moral agency.  
  Rival views in the contemporary debate regarding the existence of free will are (i) 
determinism; (ii) libertarianism; and (iii) compatibilism. Determinism lays emphasis 
on the fact that the “actions” of human beings are happenings that occur in time, and, 
hence, they are effects which are produced by specific causes. Such causes are, in their 
turn, due to earlier causes, and so what happens is something that could not be 
otherwise. Thus, causal determinism “can be defined as the view that there is exactly 
one metaphysically possible future as determined by prior events or states of affairs 
according to causal laws” (Dasti and Bryant, 48). For some thinkers who subscribe to 
this view, it is not true that “in any particular situation, we ‘could have done otherwise’ 
than what we actually did” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 48). According to this view, since 
our actions are the consequences of events in the remote past, over which we have no 
control, “causal determinism also threatens the notion that we are in control of our 
actions” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 48). Those who maintain “that causal determinism is 
true, and free will does not exist”, are known as “hard determinists” (Dasti & Bryant 
2014, 48). Libertarianism is the contrary view that causal determinism is false, and “the 
will is entirely under our control, and that this free will … is a necessary condition for 
the justice of divine reward and punishment” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 166, n.1). Will is 
free if our acts are “determined by our own intentions and desires” (Dasti & Bryant 
2014, 160); when they are otherwise caused, then the will is not involved. Among the 
libertarians, too, “the ‘agent-causal’ libertarians maintain that the cause of the free 
action is the agent himself, while the ‘event-causal’ libertarians maintain that some 
non-deterministic process that holds among some events within the agent is the cause 
of free action” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 48). Compatibilism is the view that “freedom in 
the relevant sense and universal divine determinism are compatible, and also that all 
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our free choices are also determined” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 166, n. 1), because here 
determinism is, to some extent, self-determinism. If our acts are totally random, without 
any links to our desires and intention, then such randomness would be a mark of lunacy, 
and not of freedom. In this way, freedom of will actually entails determinism of some 
sort.  
  Of course, none of the philosophical schools found in India believed in the Biblical 
myth that is at the root of these disputes, and they were not thus led to a discussion of 
free will in exactly the same manner. Some of these schools, e.g. the Cārvāka 
materialists, the Buddhists and the Jainas did not even admit the existence of an 
omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent creator of this world known as God; and Pūrva-
Mīmāṃsakas too rejected the arguments for establishing the existence of any 
omniscient being whatsoever. Thus, these schools were under no obligation to 
reconciling the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent creator of this 
world with the existence of undesirable phenomena like evil and suffering. Schools like 
Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and the different schools of Vedānta, which did admit the existence 
of such a God, had to answer the following question raised by the Buddhists and Jainas 
— if this world has indeed been created by a God who is omniscient, omnipotent, 
benevolent and merciful, then why aren’t all the inhabitants of this world equally happy 
and prosperous? A benevolent and merciful being is also supposed to be impartial, and 
an impartial creator should not create a world in which some are happy while some are 
miserable for apparently no fault of their own. That the facts are otherwise shows that 
either the world does not have a benevolent and impartial creator or that the creator of 
this world is characterized by partiality (vaiṣamya) and cruelty (nairghṛṇya). The 
Buddhists and Jainas accept the first of these alternatives, and maintain that the world 
is shaped by the results of the good and bad deeds (karmas) the creatures had performed 
in their previous births, and not by any omnipotent, omniscient, and merciful creator, 
i.e. God. Others, however, maintain that God creates the world in accordance with the 
karmas produced by the past deeds of all the individual selves in an entirely impartial 
manner, so that each of these individual selves can experience pleasure and pain 
commensurate with the karmas for which he/she alone is responsible. Hence, the 
question of God being partial or cruel does not arise at all. It is obvious that such 
responsibility cannot be assigned to the individual selves in the absence of free will on 
their part.  
  Another reason for the said difference is that there is no unanimity among the 
different schools of Indian philosophy about the nature of the self, or even about the 
very existence of self as a distinct permanent entity. For the Cārvākas, the body 
endowed with consciousness is the so-called self, while for the earlier Buddhists, who 
do not admit any permanent entity, the so-called self (pudgala/ātman) is not something 
ultimately real (paramārthasat); since what is ultimately real exists in its own right and 
thus cannot be reduced to anything else, whereas the so-called self is nothing but a mere 
sum-total (saṃghāta) of five impermanent aggregates (skandhas), viz., ‘physical form’ 
(rupa), ‘feeling’ (vedanā), ‘determinate cognition’ (saṃjñā), ‘conditioning forces’ 
(saṃskāra) and consciousness (vijñāna); again, for the Yogācāra (or Vijñānavādin) 
Buddhist, it is nothing but an unbroken flow (santāna) of discrete conscious states. 
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Being thus reducible to some more basic constituents, this so-called self is only 
‘conventionally real’ (saṃvṛtisat) or ‘empirically real’ (prajñaptisat). For the 
Mādhyamika Buddhists, whatever is dependent on something else [e.g. ‘causes’ (hetus) 
and ‘conditions’ (pratyayas)], lacks intrinsic nature (svabhāva), and is thus ‘empty’ 
(śūnya/niḥsvabhāva), and, consequently, is merely ‘a dependent designation’ (upādāya 
prajñapti), which is only another name for what is conventionally real (samvṛtisat), 
which is applicable to the so-called self that is dependent on the five skandhas.  
  Even those who admit a distinct and permanent entity called the self (ātman) often 
differ radically on many ontological and epistemological issues, and whether free will 
and agency can be genuine properties of the embodied selves known as human beings 
depends vitally on the stand that one adopts in such controversial matters. For the 
schools of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Jaina, Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, there are 
innumerable selves. Some of them liberated and others in bondage, and the selves in 
bondage are invariably embodied, the type of bodies being determined by the 
consequences of the past deeds of the respective selves inhabiting them. The actual 
multiplicity of selves is also admitted by the Kashmir school of Śaivism and the theistic 
schools of Vedānta founded by Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha, Nimbārka and 
Caitanyadeva, and, with the exception of Sāṃkhya and Yoga, all of these schools also 
admit such temporary phenomena as cognitions about specific objects 
(viṣayasphuraṇa), and pleasure, pain, desire, volition etc., as genuine properties of 
these individual selves. These selves are admitted by these schools to be actual agents.  
  The monistic school of Vedānta, founded by Saṃkarācārya, admits, on the basis of 
scriptures like the Upaniṣads and Bhagavadgītā, that the self is the same as the 
Brahman (Maṇḍūkyopaniṣad 2), which is one without a second (Chāndogyopaniṣad 
6.2.1), which is the ultimate reality (paramārthasat) that is by nature pure and infinite 
consciousness, which is also unborn, eternal, abiding and primeval (Bhagavadgītā 
2.20, Kaṭhopaniṣad 2.18); devoid of sensible properties like colour taste, sound, touch, 
smell, etc.; without beginning and end, and all-pervading [and thus devoid of temporal 
and spatial limitations] (Kaṭhopaniṣad 3.15). It is also immortal and of the nature of 
bliss (Muṇḍakopaniṣad 2.2.7); and as opposed to other inanimate mundane objects that 
are mutable and subject to destruction, this self is immutable and indestructible 
(Bhagavadgītā 12.3, 15.16). Since the ultimate reality is one that does not admit 
difference and multiplicity in any form, the various mundane objects and the individual 
selves are only empirically real (vyavahārikasat), and merely appear to us due to 
nescience (ajñāna) or ignorance (avidyā), and which consequently cease to exist once 
this ignorance is removed by the immediate apprehension of the real nature of this self 
(ātmasākṣātkāra). The individual selves are either pure consciousness delimited 
(avacchinna) by the internal organs (antaḥkaraṇa-s) or are mere semblances (abhāsa-
s) or reflections (pratibimba-s) of pure consciousness in these internal organs; and thus 
have no reality independently of this pure consciousness. Since pure consciousness is 
immutable or unchanging, it cannot have any temporary (sāmayika) or adventitious 
(āgantuka) properties. Thus, internal states like cognition about specific objects 
(vṛttijñāna), pleasure (sukha), suffering (duḥkha), desire (icchā), aversion (dveṣa), and 
volition (kṛti/prayatna) emerge as well as disappear; and hence, being temporary, are 
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not properties of even the individual selves — they actually belong to the internal 
organs that have nescience (avidyā) as their root cause (and are thus inert), that act 
either as delimiters (avacchedaka-s) or temporary adjuncts (upādhi-s) of pure 
consciousness (a claim that is supported by Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 1.5.7 and 
Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad 6.30).  
  The Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools are pluralist, and admit the ultimate reality of 
mundane objects and also of the various individual selves; yet they concur with the 
Advaita Vedāntins in maintaining that the individual selves, which are of the nature of 
pure consciousness, are immutable and hence cannot possess any temporary properties, 
since the presence of such properties entails change or transformation in their locus 
(upayannapayan dharmo vikaroti hi dharmiṇam), whereas all of the multiple selves are 
of the nature of pure consciousness (dṛśimātra). This is due to the fact that constant 
change pertains to all insentient or inert (jaḍa) entities, as well as to the prakṛti or 
pradhāna of which such entities are evolutes. Prakṛti as well as its evolutes are 
constituted by the three guṇa-s [viz. sattva, rajas and tamas] that by their very nature 
always undergo transformations (calañca guṇavṛttam; Vyāsa’s commentary on 
Yogasūtra-s 2.15 and 3.13). The multitude of puruṣa-s [i.e. selves] are, however, not 
connected with these guṇa-s in any way; and hence, all of them are equally immune to 
change (kūṭastha). This basic distinction between inert objects and conscious selves 
has been expressed emphatically by Vācaspati Miśra: “pratikṣaṇapariṇāmino hi sarve 
bhāvāḥ ṛte citiśakteḥ” (Sāṃkhyattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā no. 5); which is also 
supported by the following statement of Pañcaśikha, an ancient master of the Sāṃkhya 
school—“apariṇāmiṇī hi bhoktṛśaktirapratisaṃkramā ca pariṇāmiṇyarthe pratisaṃ-
krānteva tadvṛttimanupatati” (quoted in Vyāsa’s commentary on Yogasūtra 2.20). 
Since the selves are immutable, the selves cannot be genuine agents, since the presence 
of agency also presupposes the prior existence of desire (icchā) and volition or effort 
(kṛti), both of which are temporary and, hence, are incompatible with the immutability 
of their locus. Accordingly, the Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools ascribe agency to the 
internal organ (manas) or the principle of egoity (ahaṃkāra), which evolutes of prakṛti, 
and are thus constituted by the three guṇa-s, which are transformed constantly, the 
successive transformations being sometimes similar (sarūpapariṇāma) and sometimes 
dissimilar (virūpapariṇāma). Due to aviveka, i.e. lack of discriminative knowledge, the 
self cannot always distinguish itself from this changing principle, and consequently 
considers itself to be an agent. For the Advaita Vedāntins, what is responsible for this 
phenomenon is not the mere lack of discrimination, but also the positive fact of wrong 
identification (tādātmyādhyāsa) of the self with this internal organ. The vital distinction 
between these three schools is that while all of them deny agency in the self, the 
Sāṃkhya and Yoga school admit that the self is the experiencer (bhoktā) of pleasure 
and pain, while for the Advaita Vedāntins such experience is due to the ‘witnessing 
consciousness’ (sākṣicaitanya), and not the pure consciousness (śuddhacaitanya).  
  It has been stated before that actions, as distinct from events, are due to free choice, 
and a choice is free when one knowingly adopts some specific course of action, even 
though he /she could have chosen otherwise; in such cases alone, the person concerned 
can be said to be a genuine agent who is responsible for the action performed by 
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him/her. Thus, if a person walking on a slippery road loses his/her foothold, and, 
consequently, collides unintentionally with another person then the first person is not 
held blameworthy or responsible for this consequence since that person did not 
intentionally or purposefully lose his/her foothold. In such cases, if the first person is 
accused of causing hurt to the second person he/she can very well answer by saying, ‘I 
did not do it on purpose, though it has happened due to me’. An excellent rendering of 
this in Sanskrit, viz. “matto bhūtaṃ na tu mayā kṛtam’’ is found in some Nyāya texts. 
This distinction between doing something intentionally and unintentionally is also 
acknowledged in the Dharmaśāstra texts, where the expiation (prayāścitta) 
recommended for some lapse that has occurred unintentionally (anicchākṛta) or is due 
to ignorance (ajñānakṛta) is less severe than the expiation for the same lapse that has 
been committed intentionally (icchapūrvaka), and, hence, in full knowledge 
(jñānakṛta). That actions proper are performed according to the choice of the agents of 
those actions has been stated clearly also by Śaṃkarācārya in his commentary on 
Brahmasūtra 1.1.4, where he has drawn a distinction between cognition (jñāna) and 
action (kriyā) by pointing out that while action is puruṣatantra, i.e. dependent on the 
person concerned who is acting, since that person is capable of performing or not 
performing that action, and where there are alternative ways of performing an action 
(e.g. going to a particular place), that person may choose any one of them, and not the 
other ones. But cognition is vastutantra or viṣayatantra: it is determined ultimately by 
the actual entity (vastu) that is the object of that cognition and not by the desire or 
choice of the cognizer. Thus, under normal conditions, a person looking at a cow has 
to perceive it as a cow, and even if that person fervently desires to see it as a horse, 
he/she would be unable to do that. This is stated in the following passage by 
Śaṃkarācārya in the course of rejecting the claim that cognition is a mental activity 
(mānasī kriyā): nanu jñānaṃ nāma mānasī kriyā. na, vailakṣaṇyāt, kriyā hi nāma sā, 
yatra vastusvarūpanirapekṣaiva codyate, purusacittavyāpārādhīnā ca. yathā . . . 
“sandhyāṃ manasā dhyāyet” (Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 3.2.1) iti caivamādiṣu. dhyānam 
cintanaṃ yadyapi mānasam, tathāpi puruṣeṇa kartumakartumanyathā vā kartuṃ 
śakyam, puruṣatantratvāt, jñānaṃ tu pramāṇajanyam. pramāṇaṃ tu yathāb-
hūtavastuviṣayam. ato jñānaṃ kartumakartumanyathā vā kartumaśakyam. kevalaṃ 
vaṣtutantrameva tat, na codanātantram, nāpi puruṣatantram. tasmānmānasatve’pi 
jñānasya mahadvailakṣāṇyam. (Brahmasūtraśāṃkarabhāṣya, edited by MM 
Anantakrishna Shastri, Krishnadas Academy, Varanasi, Reprint, 2000, 128-129).  
   Having presented in outline a view of the issues across cultures, let me now turn to 
a discussion of the individual chapters in the anthology. 
 
Discussion of Meyers, Chapple, Cardona, Garfield, Lawrence, Martin Ganeri and 
Buchta  
  This anthology contains twelve articles: (1)“Agency in Sāṃkhya and Yoga: The 
unchangeability of the Eternal” by Edwin F. Bryant; (2) “Free Persons, Empty Selves: 
Freedom and Agency in Light of Two Truths” by Karin Meyers; (3) “Free Will and 
Voluntarism in Jainism” by Christopher Key Chapple; (4) “Pāṇinian Grammarians on 
Agency and Independence” by George Cardona; (5) “Nyāya’s Self as Agent and 
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Knower” by Matthew R. Dasti; (6) “Freedom Because of Duty” by Elisa Freschi; (7) 
“Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for 
Mādhyamikas” by Jay L. Garfield; (8) “Self, Causation and Agency in the Advaita of 
Śaṅkara” by Sthanewar Timalsina; (9) “The Linguistics and Cosmology of Agency in 
Nondual Kashmiri Śaiva Thought” by David Peter Lawrence; (10) “Free Will, Agency 
and Selfhood in Rāmānuja” by Martin Ganeri; (11) “Dependent Agency and 
Hierarchical Determinism in the Theology of Madhva” by David Buchta and (12) 
“Agency in the Gauḍiya Vaiṣṇava Tradition” by Satyanarayana Dasa and Jonathan B. 
Edelman. All these articles are based on primary sources, and in the case of the 
philosophical schools, attempts have been made to relate the issues under discussion 
with the fundamental tenets of the schools concerned. The coverage of this volume is 
extensive, the only influential schools that have been left out here are the Pāñcarātra 
school (the doctrines of which have wielded considerable influence on the Vaiṣṇava 
Vedāntins), the Southern schools of Śaivism as well as the Śaivite schools based on the 
commentaries on the Brahmasūtra-s by Śrīkaṇṭha and Śrīpati, Tantric texts like 
Tripurārahasya, Rudrayāmala etc., and the Vaiṣṇavite Vedānta schools founded by 
Vallabha and Nimbārka.  
  Overall, this collection of articles succeeds in giving the reader a number of well-
written, intelligible and illuminating accounts of the views of twelve Indian schools 
about free will, agency and selfhood. The chapters by Meyers, Chapple, Cardona, 
Garfield, Lawrence, Martin Ganeri and Buchta stand out as excellent, so let us begin 
by discussing this group. 
  Meyers. Garfield. The articles of Karin Meyers and Jay Garfield contain excellent 
accounts of the debate about free will and agency in Western philosophy, compare the 
relevant Western views with Buddhist doctrines, and discuss how the doctrine of two 
truths (viz. ultimate and conventional) can be utilized for establishing the Buddhist 
thesis that “from the ultimate perspective, there is no free will because there are no 
persons to enjoy it; there is merely the flow of dharmas. From the conventional 
perspective, there is most decidedly free will, of exactly the sort the Buddhist will find 
‘worth wanting’ . . .” (48). They also point out why some recent arguments given in 
favour of the admissibility of the doctrine of free will in Buddhism do not succeed.  
  Cardona. The paper by George Cardona presents the views of Pāninian 
grammarians, which have been expounded in texts that are extremely technical in 
nature and are based on the peculiarities of the Sanskrit language. These have been 
explained in an admirably lucid manner, so that even readers who are ignorant of 
Sanskrit can understand these views. Thereafter, this paper proceeds from concrete 
linguistic usages to the discussion of the abstract philosophical doctrines of these 
grammarians, such as have been developed in texts like Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari and 
the commentaries on it, noting at the same time the disagreements of the grammarians 
with other schools like Nyāya. It is perfectly justified, to include such a chapter in this 
anthology because the views of these grammarians are primarily based on standard 
linguistic usages, and not so much on epistemological or ontological considerations, 
and the adherents of the different philosophical schools also take into account such 
standard linguistic usage, which is known as śiṣṭaprayoga, when such usages are 
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conducive to the establishment of their respective doctrines as we have seen, many of 
the philosophical schools admit agency (kartṛtva) to be a property of conscious beings 
alone, while some of them admit it in the case of unconscious entities alone. Yet 
according to the grammarians, depending on the desire of the speaker (vivakṣā), agency 
can be assigned to conscious as well as unconscious entities, as can be witnessed in 
usages like, ‘I am cooking’ (ahaṃ pacāmi), and ‘the pot cooks’ (sthālī pacati), where 
the nominative case-ending indicates agency of the action (viz. the act of cooking) that 
has been expressed by the verb. The inclusion of this article thus brings to the notice of 
readers the importance of the views of grammarians on a number of philosophical 
issues. 
  Lawrence. The paper by David Lawrence, apart from being a comprehensive and 
deeply illuminating exposition of the basic tenets of Kashmiri Śaivism as well as the 
specific doctrines about free will and agency adopted in this system, consistently refers 
to some recent Western doctrines with which these views may be compared or 
connected, and ends by pointing out the areas where further research may be fruitfully 
undertaken. In Kashmir Śaivism, “Śakti (i.e. power) is incorporated into the essence of 
the God Śiva as his integral power and consort through whom, in the central myth, he 
emanates and controls the world. Through diverse rituals....the adept endeavours to 
recapitulate the basic mythic structure in order to realize salvific identity with Śiva as 
the Śaktimat, i.e. the possessor and enjoyer of Śakti” (211-212). Moreover, “[In the 
Śaiva theory,] the omnipotent agent Śiva/ the Self emanates things through his agential 
intention (iccha)..." (217-218), and thus, “the underlying material cause of the universe 
must be a conscious agent” (p.218. This theory rejects “the Advaita Vedānta version of 
satkāryavāda, according to which the universe is a projection (vivarta) on the Self, 
because of the tradition’s denial of the Self’s agency” (218). It is easy to see that such 
a system puts a lot of emphasis on the autonomy of the agent, and consequently, also 
on the existence of free will.  
Chapple. Christopher Chapple gives an account of free will and agency as 
envisaged by the Jainas, and, in this account, the views of both the sects of Jainism, 
viz. Svetāmbaras and Digambaras, have been incorporated from representative works 
of both. As opposed to the Buddhists, the Jainas admit the existence of abiding selves, 
and, as opposed to the Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Advaita schools, they admit that every self 
can be a genuine agent. In fact, the Jainas maintain that every individual has to attain 
his/her liberation through individual effort, because there is no scope for attaining it 
through either divine grace (since Jainism does not admit the existence of a creator 
God), or through the supernatural power of any saint or prophet. Human beings are in 
bondage due to the karma accumulated by them in countless earlier births, and each 
person has to attain liberation by checking the inflow of new karma-s and purging the 
accumulated karma-s by penance. Hence, voluntarism is an integral component of the 
Jaina doctrine. For the Jainas, every real entity is characterized by the acquisition of 
some new properties, discarding of some earlier properties, and permanence or 
continuity (utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṃ sat); there is thus no necessary opposition 
between change and permanence. So a permanent self may very well be an agent, 
though agency presupposes as its causes prior awareness, desire and volition, which 
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are transient properties of the agent. Both Buddha and Mahāvīra, we may note, put 
great emphasis on the individual’s effort for the attainment of nirvāṇa / kaivalya, and 
such doctrines are invariably opposed to the doctrine of fatalism (niyativāda), a 
doctrine that was preached by the mendicant Makkhali Gosāla, who was their 
contemporary; and this view of Gosāla has been vehemently opposed in both Buddhist 
scriptures like Suttapiṭaka and Jaina scriptures like Bhagavatīsūtra. (Meyers mentions 
in her article the opposition of Buddha to the doctrines of Gosāla, but, surprisingly, 
Chapple does not mention Mahāvīra’s rejection of Gosāla’s views, even though the 
quarrel between the followers of Gosāla and the Jainas was a long, acrimonious and 
bitter one.) 
 Ganeri. Martin Ganeri gives a crisp account of the views of Rāmānuja, who, on 
the basis of scriptures, reasoning and common experience, seeks to establish the view 
that the individual self is a genuine agent. His primary opponents are the adherents of 
the Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta schools, who assign agency to the internal organ, 
which is unconscious, since, as we have seen, for these two schools, the conscious 
principle or self is immutable, while agency entails some change in its locus. That the 
individual self can be an agent is also admitted by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, as 
well as the two sub-sects of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. But according to these schools, an 
individual self is an agent only so long as it is embodied — once it attains liberation, 
and thus becomes disembodied, it ceases to have qualities like cognition, desire, 
aversion, volition, and adṛṣṭa, which are essential for agency. But according to 
Rāmānuja, the liberated souls continue to be agents, and if they so desire, they may 
also assume new bodies and experience pleasure. But their activity is always subjected 
to the supreme agency of God, who is the inner controller of everything. Even though 
God is the ultimate controller, his agency in this case amounts to permission (anumati), 
in the absence of which human agency in either the embodied or the disembodied state 
becomes impossible. There are five causes for the actions of embodied human beings: 
(i) the body, (ii) the individual self, who is treated as the agent, (iii) the different sense 
organs, (iv) the five vital airs, and (v) the divine destiny (as have been enumerated in 
Bhagavadgītā 18.14). A passage in the Kauṣitakī Upaniṣad seems to suggest that it is 
God who causes the finite, individual selves to perform good and bad deeds, which 
smacks of a stronger form of divine predestination. But in his commentary on 
Brahmasūtra 2.3.41, Rāmānuja maintains that God favours those who are devoted to 
Him by causing them to find pleasure in auspicious actions; but in the case of those 
who are hostile to Him, He causes them to find pleasure in actions that are the means 
of going downward. Even though it seems that in Bhagavadgītā 3.30, 9.27 and 18.66, 
Arjuna has been asked to renounce all dharma-s, and thus to give up agency, what 
Kṛṣṇa actually meant was that Arjuna should “cultivate a mental attitude of detachment 
that is an effective means of getting free of self-centred desire for the fruits of . . . 
actions” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 249).  
All the actions of a devotee should be turned into acts of worship of the Supreme 
Self that paves the way for its liberation. Ganeri has put this doctrine in a single 
sentence: “. . . the finite self is free to act, and its actions are free, not despite the agency 
of the Supreme Self, but because of it”. In his commentary on Brahmasūtra 2.3.41, 
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Rāmānuja gives an analogy to support this claim. When a property is owned jointly by 
two persons, one of them cannot give it to a third person without the consent of the 
other owner. But it does not affect the agency of the first person in any significant 
manner. Rāmānuja has also put forward the novel view that like the individual souls in 
bondage, God too is embodied (even though such a view is apparently inconsistent with 
scriptural passages like Īśavāsyopaniṣad, Kaṭhopaniṣad 2.22, Praśnopaniṣad 4.10, 
Munḍakopaniṣad 1.1.6, Śvetāvateropaniṣad 3.19 and 6.8, and so on). Perhaps in order 
to make this uncommon position acceptable, Rāmānuja has defined ‘body’ in a novel 
manner, which enables him to admit the world as well as the individual selves as the 
body of God, since in his commentary on Brahmasūtra 2.1.9, Rāmānuja has defined 
body as “any substance which a conscious entity can completely control and support 
for its own purposes, and whose nature is solely to be accessory of that entity is the 
body of that entity” (Dasti & Bryant 2014,  236), and in the case of God, such a 
definition of body is applicable to the world along with the individual selves.  
Ganeri has also evaluated the system of Rāmānuja in a systematic manner, and parts 
of his concluding remarks are as follows: “Rāmānuja, then argues for an account of the 
self in which the self (whether Supreme or finite) is a conscious subject that exercises 
real and free agency . . . . for Rāmānuja it is a matter of how that agency is exercised 
that determines whether it leads to a form of embodiment that causes that self further 
limitation and misery, or becomes an expression of joyful creativity sharing in the 
transcendent agency of the Supreme Self. . . . . His account thus maintains a form of 
compatibilism that is to be found in other classical theistic traditions” (Dasti & Bryant 
2014, 253). Ganeri also maintains that this system of Viśiṣṭādvaita “. . . would seem 
more fairly to be characterized as containing unresolved polarities than being 
incoherent” (ibid.), and in his opinion, “. . . to some extent the polarities that arise are 
due to the fact that he often does not go beyond what is necessary to explain either the 
sūtra or Gītā text sufficiently. However, to some extent the polarities are the common 
ones that abide in such theistic accounts in many traditions and mark the limits of 
human reason to make sense of realties that transcend them” (ibid.).  
Butcha. In his paper on the views of Madhvācārya, David Buchta has observed 
very pertinently that “while Madhva comments on the same core of canonical texts as 
other Vedānta writers, his interpretations of those texts often differ radically from those 
of other Vedāntins. Nevertheless, his writings and that of his tradition have had an 
important influence on the development of other schools, and his views on human 
agency and free will are distinct in important ways” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 255). In this 
valuable and illuminating paper, Buchta has very correctly pointed out that while the 
Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools deny genuine agency to the self on the ground that the 
presence of such agency in the self is not compatible with the immutability of the self, 
and the Buddhists along with the Advaita Vedāntins admit the agency of individual 
persons on the level of conventional reality (saṃvṛti/vyavahāra) and deny it on the 
level of ultimate reality (paramārtha), the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools maintain that 
agency belongs permanently to God, and temporarily to the finite selves only during 
their state of embodiment, since it is absent when they are liberated. Madhva, however, 
maintains that agency (kartṛtva) in the true sense of independence (svātantrya) belongs 
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only to God: in the case of the individual selves, independence is always subordinate 
to divine agency, and that too, only in relations to those lower than oneself, but such 
agency characterizes the individual selves even during their liberated state. These finite 
selves cannot even attain liberation without the grace of God. Madhva differs sharply 
from the adherents of other schools in maintaining that each self has a specific inherent 
nature (svabhāva) that makes it inclined to behave in a particular manner; depending 
on which it may be able to attain liberation through its volition, or undergo an endless 
number of reincarnations throughout its existence, or be subjected to perpetual 
suffering in hell. This doctrine, that smacks of predestination, brings the system of 
Madhva perilously close to fatalism (niyativāda), which has been condemned and 
rejected by almost all the other schools of Indian philosophy. According to Madhva, 
that the individual or finite self has agency has been specifically stated in Brahmasūtra-
s 2.3.33-42, which are, in their turn, based on scriptural passages like “one attains the 
result of the actions one performs” (Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 4.4.5), and “the world 
should meditate upon the Lord alone” (Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 1.4.15); and that such 
agency is present even during liberation has been stated in Chāndogyopaniṣad 8.12.3.  
In agreement with Rāmānuja, Madhva also maintains that the liberated self may 
assume a “luminous” body that is conducive to its activities like serving God, if it so 
desires, and that even in the absence of such a body it can experience pleasures of 
various kinds (though the second claim made here is not consistent with scriptural 
passages like Chāndogyopaniṣad 8.12.1). Even though God is omniscient, omnipotent 
and merciful, and even though the nature of each individual is under His control, He 
chooses not to change this nature of the selves who are destined to undergo perpetual 
reincarnation or condemnation in hell; but one cannot, on that ground, accuse God for 
being partial to some persons, and being unkind and cruel to other persons, since “the 
Lord is transcendent with regard to the presence of virtues and faults, being without 
beginning, and being the origin of [all] living beings” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 265). But 
even those who are fit for attaining liberation, cannot attain it solely by their effort, 
because in order to attain it, one must “(1) have the right destiny (under the control of 
the Lord); (2) have the right prior activities (under the control of the Lord); (3) manifest 
the right volition (under the control of the Lord); (4) engage in and fulfil the practice 
of worship of (by the grace of the Lord), and thus (5) attain devotion (by the grace of 
the Lord)” (Dasti & Bryant 2014,  269). Buchta quite justifiably remarks here: “As one 
can see, while Madhva asserts that the self is an agent, it has very little, if any, control 
over its actions” (ibid.).  
Buchta examines critically the claim of two contemporary scholars that this 
doctrine of inequality (asamatva) and hierarchy (tāratamya) among the finite selves 
provides the “best solution to the problem of how to reconcile the experience of evil 
and suffering in the world with an omnipotent and benevolent God” (Dasti & Bryant 
2014, 269). For Buchta, though, the system of Madhva presents three problems that 
have not been solved satisfactorily. First, it has not been proved by Madhva that God 
is not responsible in any way for the evil deeds of people and the consequent sufferings, 
because he could have prevented such things if he had merely so desired and yet he 
chooses not to. This amounts to what is known as “culpable negligence” in modern 
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legal parlance. The second problem is that the alleged hierarchy among finite selves 
has a dangerous consequence: a person may not know his/her place in this hierarchy, 
and may thus doubt whether he/she is at all fit for liberation; in the face of such doubt, 
the very aspiration for liberation would become impossible. In the words of Buchta, 
“while the unabashed claim that some people are just inherently evil may seem to be 
an honest assessment of the world as we experience it, it offers no hope for the lower 
selves. To find hope, one must assume oneself to be one of the highest selves” (Dasti 
& Bryant 2014, 271). But that, as we see, is hardly possible in the system of Madhva. 
Finally, the claim that even if God is partial to His devotees, it should not be regarded 
as a fault because He transcends the rules of morality that are applicable for human 
beings, is not very satisfactory, unless one can give further justification of this claim in 
terms of transcendence.  
Buchta concludes his discussion by pointing out that even though the views of 
Madhva may be criticised on several counts, it is undeniable that his system has 
significantly influenced the subsequent schools of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta founded by 
Vallabha and Caitanyadeva. So far as the hierarchy of selves is concerned, the 
adherents of the school of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism (founded by Caitanyadeva) like 
Baladeva Vidyabhūṣṇa and Viśvanātha Cakravartin have admitted that such a hierarchy 
does exist, and that God is indeed partial to His devotees, who are the good souls. But 
such a partiality, which makes him protect his devotees by suppressing the wicked 
persons, should be considered as an ‘ornament’ (bhūṣana), and not as a fault (dūṣaṇa). 
Vallabha goes one step further, and maintains that even though all the individual selves 
are intrinsically good, God changes some of them into wicked ones, and creates a 
hierarchy that suits His purpose. The response of the followers of Madhva to the 
charges that have been brought against the system of their Master (ācārya) also 
deserves to be studied in depth. Buchta also records the findings of Roque Mesquita 
that a large number of quotations in the works of Madhva are either from unknown 
sources, or are not traceable in the texts from which they have been claimed to have 
been taken; and this certainly puts a question mark on the authenticity of the so-called 
scriptural support for the doctrines of Madhva.  
 
Discussion of Dasa and Edelman, Bryant, Dasti, Freschi and Timalsina  
The remaining chapters in the anthology all make valuable contributions. The papers 
exhibit great erudition, and offer genuine insights into problems of Indian philosophy. 
The reviewer will not attempt to summarise the content of these chapters, but will 
simply engage with some points and issues that they arise. 
Dasa and Edelman. The paper entitled “Agency in the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava 
Tradition” by Satyanarayana Dasa and Jonathan B. Edelman shows how the exponents 
of this school, such as Jīva Gosvāmin, Viśvanātha Cakravartin and Baladeva 
Vidyābhūṣaṇa, on the basis of texts such as Bhāgavata Pūrāṇa, maintain that the 
individual self can be a real agent even in the liberated state, and that in such a state, 
the individual self has a different type of body that makes it possible for it to enjoy 
happiness of the highest sort. In order to explain how the individual self can be a 
genuine agent, the relation of the self with the mind-body complex has been explained 
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in terms of the inherent properties of the self as well as its extrinsic properties. Thus, 
the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas differ from schools like Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Advaita Vedānta, 
which deny agency in the individual self, as well as from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools 
that admit agency only in the individual self that is in bondage. This paper also shows 
how these adherents interpret in a different way the verses in scriptures like 
Bhagavadgītā that at best apparently deny the agency of individual selves.  
While this paper points out in a footnote (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 299) the similarity 
between the view of Jīva Gosvāmin and those of Nimbārka, it does not compare the 
views of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas with the views of Madhva, even though, as has been 
pointed out by Buchta, “Baladeva promulgates a guru succession that connects 
Caitanya to Madhva in the opening of his Prameyaratnāvalī. A similar list can [also] 
be found in the 16th century Gaurāṅgoddeśadīpikā of Kavi Karṇapūra . . .” (Dasti & 
Bryant 2014, 272, fn. 43). Moreover, in his commentary on Brahmasūtra 2.1.35-36, 
Baladeva “closely follows that of Madhva, citing the same texts (including untraceable 
passages likely composed by Madhva himself)” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 273-274), 
although “In commenting on sūtra 37, Baladeva significantly differs from Madhva” 
(Dasti & Bryant 2014,  274). Whether or not such influences of Madhva are traceable 
in the writings of Jīva Gosvāmin and Viśvanātha Cakravartin could very profitably 
have been discussed in this paper.  
Bryant. Bryant states at the concluding part that “…to a great extent, the 
unwelcome corollaries of Sāṃkhya’s hard-line position…act as a trigger for much 
subsequent development in Indian philosophy. Unhappy with the Sāṃkhya position, 
Nyāya seeks to couple an eternal unchanging ātman as substance with separable 
changing qualities such as agency; Buddhism to jettison notions of any eternal entities 
in the first place, and Advaita Vedānta of non-eternal ones; and the theists to conclude 
that irresolvable philosophical problems of this sort mandate the existence of an Īśvara 
who is beyond comprehension. . . . We are thus left with the choice of, on the one hand, 
an ongoing chronological history of philosophical debate between the various schools 
. . . or, on the other hand, of accepting the will of an inconceivable Īśvara beyond the 
boundaries of philosophical resolution. Sāṃkhya, as the earliest expression of 
systematic philosophy evidenced in Sanskrit texts, has, in many ways, set the stage for 
both options” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 38-39). This is a valuable observation, though it 
would be somewhat misleading to say that, for the Nyāya system, the self is eternal and 
unchanging. That the self, according to Nyāya, is eternal, is certainly true. But the claim 
that it is “unchanging” is not correct. For the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, bondage 
and liberation are genuine as well as mutually opposed states of a self, and, hence, when 
a self becomes liberated it undergoes genuine change. For the Sāṃkhya school, 
however, the unchanging self (puruṣa) does not undergo any genuine change, since it 
remains immutable (kūṭastha) even when liberation takes place — because what 
undergoes bondage and attains liberation is the unconscious prakṛti. Again, we come 
across the following sentences: “For our purposes here, a well-known axiom central to 
much Indian philosophising becomes pivotal in this regard: If something is eternal, then 
that thing cannot change. And by the principle of anvaya-vyatireka, the contrapositive 
holds true: if something undergoes change, it cannot be eternal. This, then, for 
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Sāṃkhya, requires that if an ātman be deemed an entity that is eternal, . . its essence or 
nature must also be eternal; they can never change or move . . .” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 
19). As a matter of fact, this rule is admitted only in Advaita Vedānta, where the only 
eternal principle, viz. Ātman or Brahman, is admitted as unchanging. All else is subject 
to change, and hence, are not ultimately real. Strangely enough, Bryant also states quite 
correctly in p. 37 that according to Sāṃkhya, prakṛti is eternal, even though it 
undergoes change or transformation at every moment. This is evident from the remark 
of Vācaspati Miśra while justifying the expression ‘prasavadharmi’ as an adjective of 
prakṛti in Sāṃkhyakāṛikā 11: “ ‘prasavadharmeti vaktavye matvarthīyaḥ 
prasavadharmasya nityayogam ākhyātum. sarūpa-virūpa-pariṇāmābhyāṃ na 
kadācidapi viyujyata ityarthaḥ”. Again, in his commentary on Sāṃkhyakārikā 5, 
Vācaspati Miśra has stated that apart from the conscious principle, all else undergoes 
change at every moment: “pratikṣaṇapariṇāmino hi sarve bhāvāḥ ṛte citiśakteḥ”; and 
here, “all else” includes prakṛti as well. These two statements of Bryant (Dasti & 
Bryant 2014, 19 and 27) flatly contradict each another. So far as schools other than 
Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Advaita Vedānta are concerned, the so-called principle stated 
above has not been accepted at all. Thus, for the schools like Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, all 
eternal substances like the atoms of the four great elements, Ākāśa, Space, Time, Self; 
and also Mind (manas) undergo innumerable conjunctions and disjunctions with 
various other substances, and both conjunctions and disjunctions are temporary 
qualities. Besides, the colour, smell and taste of earth-atoms undergo change due to 
their connection with heat. Moreover, the self that in bondage can have some 
distinguishing qualities (viśeṣaguṇa-s) like cognition, desire, happiness, suffering, 
volition, merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and memory impressions that are non-
eternal; and Ākāśa can be qualified by the distinguishing quality known as sound. Some 
of these qualities last for only two moments. All the founders of the theistic schools of 
Vedānta, starting from Bhāskara (whose name surprisingly does not surprisingly occur 
anywhere in this collection) to Baladeva, maintain that Brahman, the ultimate and 
eternal reality, is both the material cause (upādānakāraṇa) as well as the efficient cause 
(nimittakāraṇa) of the world, and, hence, subject to transformation (pariṇāma). It is 
thus evident that the claim made by Bryant quoted above is not correct.  
This error has spread to several other articles, where, on the authority of Bryant 
(who has reiterated it on Dasti & Bryant 2014, 24 and 27), it has been repeated again 
and again in this anthology (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 10, 129, 134, and 288). The fact of 
the matter is that for the Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools, the unconscious prakṛti and its 
evolutes that are constituted by the three guṇa-s (sattva, rajas, and tamas) always 
undergo change, since these three guṇa-s are liable to change by their very nature 
(calañca guṇavṛttam—Vyāsa’s commentary on Yogasūtra 2.17). By contrast, puruṣa, 
which is conscious and has no connection with these three guṇa-s, is immutable and 
unchanging. Fortunately, Ganeri and Buchta have been more careful and exact while 
discussing this issue (see Dasti & Bryant 2014, 219 and 256).  
In footnote no. 14 on (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 23), we come across two sentences that 
are also not quite accurate. These are: “Satkāryavāda is the view that all effects are 
present in one cause. Nyāya is asatkāryavāda: effects are new entities not present in 
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their causes; reality is to be understood as product of seven distinct causes”. 
Satkāryavāda is the doctrine that what is called an effect (kārya) is pre-existent in its 
material cause (upādanakāraṇa) in a subtle (sukṣma) or unmanifest (avyakta) form— 
the task of the efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa) is to make it gross (sthūla) or manifest 
(abhivyakta). The further claim that all effects are ultimately present in one material 
cause (viz. prakṛti) is established on the consideration of parsimony (lāghava). But for 
asatkāryavāda, there is prior non-existence of an effect in its material cause (where the 
effect inheres after its production)— the efficient cause brings that effect into existence. 
The real point of difference between these schools is that what are treated by the 
supporters of asatkāryavāda to be cases of generation (utpatti) and destruction 
(vināśa), are regarded as cases of manifestation (avirbhāva) and disappearance or 
reabsorption (tirobhāva) respectively by the supporters of satkaryāvāda. The last part 
of this remark by Bryant (viz. “reality is to be understood as the product of seven 
distinct causes”) is totally incomprehensible to the present reviewer. The expression 
“seven causes” may mean either ‘seven kinds of causes’, or it may mean ‘causes that 
are seven in number.’ Now, supporters of Asatkaryāvāda like the Naiyāyikas, 
Vaiśeṣikas and Prābhākara Mīmaṃsakas admit only the following three types of 
causes: (i) samavāyikāraṇa, (ii) asamavāyikāraṇa and (iii) nimittakāraṇa — and thus, 
“seven causes” cannot mean here “seven kinds of causes”. Besides, for these 
philosophers, reality comprises an infinite number of eternal and non-eternal things, 
that may be classified into seven types or categories of reals. The eternal entities are 
obviously not products of any causes whatsoever. Among the non-eternal entities, the 
positive ones alone are produced by all these three types of causes, and non-eternal 
negative entities, like destruction, are produced by their respective nimittakāraṇas 
alone; and hence, there is nothing that can be produced by “seven types of causes.” It 
would also be improper to claim that every real effect is produced by causes that are 
exactly seven in number, since this claim does not hold in every case. One can cite 
some other passages from this chapter that are equally problematic, but perhaps the 
examples given here will serve the purpose at hand.  
Dasti. Dasti provides valuable insights into the Nyāya view that agency and free 
will are genuine properties of the finite selves, and he discusses how the different 
doctrines of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools provide a coherent defence of these 
claims. The causal chain from cognitions to actions via the intermediate states of 
desire/aversion and volition or effort has been explained with meticulous care, and it 
also contains the following pertinent observation: “In debates over the existence of the 
self, Buddhism is Nyāya’s greatest opponent; but when discussing the nature of self, 
Nyāya often takes aim at the Sāṃkhya school” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 121). This remark 
is perfectly justified, because unless the immutability of self is denied, it cannot be 
claimed that the self can be an agent in the proper sense of the term. But one may add 
here that in this debate, the Advaita Vedāntins also deny agency to self, and the Nyāya 
philosophers must argue against them as well.  
A few issues can be raised. One comes across the sentence: “….. Nyāya defends a 
more robust notion of selfhood, placing desire, aversion, volition and moral 
responsibility alongside cognition as the self’s distinctive qualities.” (Dasti & Bryant 
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2014, 112-113). It is obvious that, here, jñāna, icchā, dveṣa and prayatna have been 
quite correctly translated as ‘cognition’, ‘desire’, ‘aversion and volition’ respectively. 
However, according to Nyāyasūtra 1.1.10 (icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥ- 
khajñānānyātmano liṅgam), pleasure (sukha) and pain (duḥkha) are also two 
distinctive qualities of the self that is in bondage, and their omission here seems to be 
somewhat surprising, since desire for or aversion towards an object is produced due to 
the past experiences of pleasure and pain respectively produced by that object. 
Moreover, ascription of pleasure and pain to the self complete the Nyāya picture of the 
self that is the cogniser (jnātā), doer (kartā) as well as the enjoyer (bhoktā) of the results 
of its actions, such enjoyment being due to merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma), 
which are also distinctive qualities of the self in bondage, and which accrue to the self 
on account of morally good actions and morally bad actions respectively performed by 
that self. Perhaps Dasti has rendered dharma and adharma, (which are collectively 
called adṛṣṭa) as “moral responsibility,” and the present reviewer is not certain that the 
expression “moral responsibility” can fully convey the specific senses in which the 
terms “dharma” and “adharma” have been used in Nyāya philosophy. Again, it has 
been stated that for the Nyāya school, the locus of consciousness is the self, and that 
the same is the case with the Sāṃkhya school (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 122). However, 
there is a subtle but significant distinction between the tenets of these two schools. For 
the Nyāya school, the self is a substance that may at some time be characterised by the 
temporary quality known as cognition or consciousness (jñāna/caitanya), whereas for 
the Sāṃkhya school, consciousness, which is eternal and immutable, is the very nature 
of the self. In Sanskrit, one can say that for the Nyāya school, the self can sometimes 
become cetana, whereas for the Sāṃkhya school, the self is always caitanyasvarūpa.  
One comes across the strange sentence “the category of self (ātmajāti) is delimited 
by the condition of being a substratum of pleasure, pain and the rest” (Dasti & Bryant 
2014, 122), a translation of the Sanskrit sentence “ātmajātistu sukhaduḥkhādi-
samavāyikāraṇatā-avacchedakatayā sidhyati”, that occurs in Siddhāntamuktavalī on 
Bhāṣāpariccheda. Here the word ‘atma-jāti’ has been printed wrongly, it should be 
‘ātmatvajāti’, and its translation should be “the universal [known as] selfhood”, and 
the translation of the entire sentence may be something like “the universal [known as] 
selfhood is established as that [property] which delimits the property of being the cause 
in which pleasure, pain and the rest inhere”. In this paper, Dasti has translated manas 
as ‘mind’, which is perfectly in order. But sometimes, instead of the word manas, which 
is a nominal stem, he has used the word ‘manaḥ’, which is obtained when ‘manas’ is 
declined in the singular number of nominative case that takes the first nominal triplet-
endings (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 113, 115, 121, 122, 123, and 126), though in other such 
cases, only the relevant nominal stem has been mentioned. On one page both the forms 
manas and manaḥ have been used, and more care should have been taken here.  
Dasti has remarked that the expression pratyātmaniyamādbhukteḥ has been 
employed by Udayana in verse no. 1.4 of his Nyāyakusumāñjali for rejecting the views 
of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 125). The claim that Udayana 
wants to reject some Sāmkhya-Yoga texts is true, since it is supported by Udayana’s 
autocommentary on verse no. 1.14, which starts with the introductory remark “etena 
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sāṃkhyamatam apāstam”, where we find a summary statement of the Sāṃkhya views 
and their refutation. But this particular quarter of verse no. 1.4 is primarily aimed at the 
view that the results produced by human actions have the objects of enjoyment as their 
loci, and not the relevant individual selves. For example, the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsakas 
maintain that when the things to be offered in a sacrifice are sanctified as per the 
instructions of scriptures, a special property called apūrva is produced in those things, 
which ultimately leads to the result supposed to be produced by that sacrifice. In like 
manner, such apūrva-s, being located in the objects of enjoyment, produce pleasure 
and pain in individual selves. This Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā view has been stated in verse no. 
1.10 with its auto-commentary, while its refutation is found in verse no. 1.11 with its 
auto-commentary.  
Dasti writes, “If buddhi is temporary and subject to destruction, then (according to 
a widely held principle in Indian thought) it must also have a beginning” (Dasti & 
Bryant 2014, 128). What has been stated here holds good only of all temporary entities 
that are positive in nature (bhāvapadārtha-s). Those who, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, 
admit also negative entities, maintain that the absence of an entity prior to its creation 
has no beginning, though it has an end, and the absence of a thing after its destruction 
(dhvaṃsābhāva) has a beginning, but it has no end (anādiḥ sāntaḥ pragabhāvaḥ, sādiḥ 
anantaḥ dhvaṃsābhāvaḥ).  
Dasti has observed that Udayana has drawn a distinction between properties 
(dharma-s) and property - bearers (dharmin-s) (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 129). This is true, 
but much before Udayana, this distinction was established by Uddyotakara in his 
Nyāyavārttika (NV) on Nyāyabhāṣya 1.1.14, and this view of Uddyotakara was 
defended against the counterclaims of the Buddhists (for whom there is no such 
distinction here), and of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas (who admit here identity- in - 
difference instead of full-fledged difference or distinction) by Vācaspati Miśra in his 
Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (NVTT). (For details, see NV ed. by A. Thakur, ICPR, 
1997, 68-74 and NVTT, ed. by A.Thakur, ICPR, 1994, 86-89 and 187-194.) Besides, 
the categorical framework admitted in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools would collapse 
unless such a distinction is admitted. In this categorical scheme, the seven types of 
entities that are admitted happen to be substance, quality, action, universal, 
particularity, inherence and absence/negation; which are absolutely different from one 
another, such difference between them being implied by the division of all entities into 
seven, and only seven groups; which is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Here, 
component substances that are effects, are located through the relation inherence in its 
component parts that are the inherent causes of this effect; qualities and actions are 
located through inherence in substances to which they belong; universals are located 
through inherence in substances, qualities and actions characterized by them; 
particularities are located through inherence in eternal substances; inherence is an 
eternal relation that is located in its relata through a self-linking relation 
(svarūpasambandha); and negation, which requires a location as well as a counter 
positive (pratiyogin), and resides in its location through another self-linking relation. 
In each of these cases, there is a full-fledged distinction between a property-bearer and 
its properties.  
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Freschi. There are many interesting issues to discuss in the paper by Freschi, which 
contains, besides, a lot of useful information and valuable observations. For example, 
there is the following sentence: “Thus the Veda is the only instrument of knowledge 
regarding what is to be done instead of what there is” (emphasis added) (Dasti & Bryant 
2014, 138). This is an overstatement, because the Vedas are held to be authoritative 
about only those means of attaining what is desirable and avoiding what is undesirable, 
which cannot be known through either perception or inference. Such has been stated 
by Sāyanācārya in his Ṛgvedādibhāṣyabhūmikā (pratyakṣeṇānumityā vā yastūpāyo na 
vedyate / enaṃ vidanti vedena tasmādvedasya vedatā// Thus one has to know only from 
the Vedas that one who wants to attain heaven should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice, 
and that one who has not performed the Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices should not 
perform any Soma sacrifices. But even those who are either ignorant of the Vedas, or 
are not entitled to study the Vedas, or have not studied the Vedas even though entitled 
to do so, or do not even regard the Vedas as authoritative, know very well that a sick 
person should take the medicines prescribed by the physician, and that one should not 
put one’s hand in a blazing fire. Likewise, when a person asks his servant to close the 
door, the latter does not require the help of the Vedas for knowing what is to be done 
by him. In such cases, what we should or should not do is known from our mundane 
experience, or from the advice of knowledgeable persons. 
 In footnote 3, we find the following sentence: “The Naiyāyika Jayanta Bhaṭṭa 
gives, in fact, as evidence of the Veda’s validity, that after having performed a 
grāmakāma sacrifice, his grandfather actually conquered a village” (Dasti & Bryant 
2014, 139). There are at least two errors in this statement, and also a questionable 
assertion. First, the word “grāmakāma” employed by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is not the name of 
any sacrifice – it simply means “someone who wants to acquire a village”, just as the 
word “svargakāma” employed in the injunction “svargakāmo yajeta” is not the name 
of any sacrifice but simply means “one who wants to attain heaven.” (In technical 
parlance, such a person is called “adhikārin.”) Second, the actual name of the sacrifice 
performed by the grandfather of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa was “sāṃgrahaṇī”, as is evident from 
the relevant statement of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa : “tathā hyasmatpitāmaha eva grāmakāmaḥ 
sāṃgrahaṇīm kṛtavān. sa iṣṭisamāptisamānantaram eva gauramūlakaṃ grāmam 
avāpa.” (Nyāyamañjarī, Oriental Institute, Mysore, edited by V. Varadacharya, Vol. I, 
653). Third, “conquering a village” befits a kṣatriya, who is by profession a warrior, 
and hence, entitled to participate in warfare and thus conquer some territory. A brāhmin 
(i.e. member of the priestly class) like the grandfather of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa was more likely 
to receive the village called “gauramūlaka” as a gift (dāna/pratigraha) from the local 
king or some such person.  
In footnote 10, there is the following sentence: “Predestination is, accordingly, only 
admitted by the theistic school of Dvaita Vedānta founded by Madhva…..” (emphasis 
added) (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 142-143). We have already noted that much earlier than 
Madhva, the doctrine of pre-determinism that verged on fatalism (niyativāda) was 
preached by Makkhali Gosāla (the founder of the sect of mendicants known as Ājīvika-
s), and whose doctrines were vehemently criticized by both Buddha and Mahāvīra.  
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At (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 146), there is the following sentence: “Thus, for 
Prābhākaras, desire is only the indirect cause of action (the direct cause being the 
prescription).” However, a totally opposite view is found at (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 304-
305) with reference to Gurusammatapadārthāḥ (a small work on Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā 
by an anonymous author, that has been appended to Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa edited 
by Swamī Yogīndrānanda; Varanasi): “prayatnaḥ dvividhaḥ – jīvanapūrvakaḥ icchād-
veṣapūrvakaśca.……tasya [i.e. jīvanapūrvasya] dharmādharmāpekṣād ātmama-
naḥsaṃyogādutpattiḥ. icchādveṣapūrvakaprayatnastu……icchādveṣāpekṣād ātmama-
naḥsaṃyogād utpadyate.” Here, one also finds the following sentence: “icchāphalāni 
tu prayatnakṛtidharmādharmāḥ…..” From such sentences, it follows that for 
Prābhākaras, apart from activities like breathing etc. that are due to vital processes 
within a person’s body, many actions can be due to either desire or aversion. None of 
these sentences mentions prescription as the immediate cause of volition. Moreover, in 
Tantrarahasya of Rāmānujācārya, another well-known work of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, 




thavicārānupayogānnās-makaṃ tatrābhiniveśaḥ. Here, it has been clearly stated, after 
enumerating the qualities (which include cognition, desire, aversion and volition) that 
the manners in which these qualities are produced and destroyed are to be known from 
the work of Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system. It has been stated with 
evidence in the paper by Dasti that in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, the causal 
chain resulting in action is either cognition®desire® volition(or effort) ®action, or 
cognition®aversion®volition (or effort) ®action, and as we have already noted, this 
is acceptable to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas as well. Thus, even Rāmānujācārya does 
not admit ‘prescription’ as the invariable and immediate antecedent of all types of 
activities.  
There are, on the other hand, some statements in Prabhākaravijaya of Nandīśvara, 
as also some verses quoted in it from Prakaraṇapañcikā of Śālikanatha Miśra, that may 
have induced Freschi to think that for Prābhākarās one performs an action only when 
one knows from some prescription that this particular action is kārya, i.e. something 
that is fit for being performed, or what ought to be performed. For the Prābhākaras, it 
is the obligatoriness of the prescribed action that induces one to perform it rather than 
the fact that the action concerned produces some desirable result. Here, the view that is 
being rejected has been maintained by Maṇḍana Miśra, the noted author of Vidhiviveka, 
who maintains in the following verse of this work that an imperative impels the listener 
for performing the prescribed action, since it is iṣṭasādhana, i.e. the means of attaining 
something desirable: puṃso neṣṭābhyupāyatvāt kriyāsvanyaḥ pravartakaḥ / 
pravṛttihetuṃ dharmañca pravadanti pravartanām // (Vidhiviveka, verse no.27). 
Śālikanātha and Nandīśvara have tried to show against this view that the two properties 
kāryatva and iṣṭasādhanatva are not equipollent (i.e. co-extensive), and hence, they 
cannot be said to be the same. Thus, the past acts of eating etc. are characterized by 
iṣṭasādhanatā, but not by kāryatā, since it is not possible for anyone to perform acts 
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that have happened in the past; and pleasure is characterized by kāryatā, and not by 
iṣṭasādhanatā, since pleasure is desirable in itself, and is not a means for attaining 
something else that is desirable. This argument, and a few others, have been stated in 
the following passage: (i) “ ….. kāryadhīta eva pravṛttiḥ. tadanvayavyatirekitvāt 
pravṛtteḥ. iṣṭopāyajñānasyāpyan-vayavyatirekau sta iti cenna. Kāryajñānot-
pādakatvenānyathāsiddhatvāt ……yatra kāryajñānaṃ nāsti, kevalamiṣṭopāya-
jñānameva, tatrātītānāgatavar-tamānopāyajñāne’pi pravṛttīrna dṛśyate. Nan-vayaṃ 
vyabhicāra iṣṭopāyatāyāḥ kāryadhī-janane’pi samaḥ. naivam. kṛtyuddeś-
yasyeṣṭopāyasya kāryadhīhetutvam. ato’tītādi-vyavrttisiddhih. dvidhā hyupāyatādhīh 
– atītādyākārā kāryākārā ca. tatra kāryākārataḥ pravṛttiḥ kāryadhītaḥ 
pravṛttirityucyate. (ii) ……iṣṭopāyatvameva kāryatvamiti na śakyate vaktum. Kārya-
tveṣṭopāyatvayoratyantabhedasya sphuṭatvāt. kāryatvaṃ ca iṣṭe vartate, iṣṭasādhane 
ca. tathā’niṣṭaparihāre’pi vartate. iṣṭopāyatvaṃ tu na tatheti tayorbhedaḥ sphuṭatara 
eva…….kiñca anyonyavyabhicārādapi bhedaḥ. kāryatvaṃ sukhe’pi vidyate, 
tatreṣṭopāyatvaṃ nāsti. iṣṭopāyatvaṃ bhūtabhojanādāvapi vartate, tatra kāryatvam 
nasti………etatsarvamabhipretyoktaṃ Prakaraṇapañcikāyām – “phalasādha-natā 
nāma parā parā ca kāryatā /” iti, kāryatā kṛtisādhyatvaṃ phalasādhanatā punaḥ/ 
kāraṇatvaṃ phalotpāde te bhidyete parasparam//” iti ca. (Prabhākaravijaya, edited by 
D. Prahlada Char, Bangalore, 35-37.) Now, it is a fact that according to Prābhākaras, a 
command or imperative expresses that the action prescribed therein is obligatory, and, 
thereby, produces some activity. This may create the impression that the reverse is also 
true, i.e. whenever someone acts in a particular way, it is due to some prescription or 
command. But we have already noted that this is not always the case.  
Freschi states that “Kumārila is even ready as far as to risk denying the fixedness 
(nitya) of the self, in order to make room for the possibility of its undergoing change” 
(Dasti & Bryant 2014, 148); and in support of it, verse nos. 22cd-23cd from the 
Ātmavāda section of Ślokavārttika and the commentary on them by Pārthasārathi Miśra 
have been quoted in footnote no.26 (viz. “yadi vikāramātram anityaṃ tadastu, na hi 
vikāramatreṇa svarūpocchedo bhavati, pratyabhijñānāt”). Yet from the context of the 
verses it is also clear that what is at stake here is not the mutability of the self, but its 
permanence. Besides, there is the hint that even though some people may prefer to 
apply the term ‘anitya’ to a thing that is subject to change, the term ‘anitya’ usually 
means something that is not eternal, and a thing is called 'eternal' if it has neither 
origination (utpatti), nor destruction (vināśa). This has been explicitly stated by 
Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary on Brahmasūtra 1.1.4, where he has drawn a 
distinction between entities that are admitted by some schools to be permanent or 
eternal, even though they undergo change, and those that are permanent as well as 
immutable. The three guṇa-s admitted by the Sāṃkhya school and the atoms etc. 
admitted by Vaiśeṣikas are examples of the first type, whereas Ātman/Brahman 
admitted in Advaita Vedānta is the example of the second type: The relevant comments 
of Śaṅkarācārya are as follows : “tatra kiñcit pariṇāminityaṃ yasmin vikriyamāṇe’pi 
‘tadevedam’ iti buddhir na vihanyate, yathā pṛthivyādijagannityatvavādinām, yathā ca 
sāṃkhyānāṃ guṇāḥ. idaṃ tu pāramārthikaṃ kūṭasthanityaṃ vyomavat sarvavyāpi 
sarvakriyārahitaṃ …..svayaṃjyotisvabhāvam”. (Brahmasūtraśāṃkarabhāṣya with 
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Bhāmatī, Vedāntakalpataru and Kalpataruparimala, edited by M.M. Anantakrishna 
Shastri, Nirnay Sagar Press, Bombay, 1938, 117-119.) Besides, one may also treat here 
the initial reactions of Kumārila and Pārthasārathi as the provisional admission of the 
opponent’s view for the sake of argument, though such a position is liable to be rejected 
subsequently. This procedure, which is employed quite often in works of Indian 
philosophy, is technically called prauḍhivāda, and its adoption is justified by the 
popular maxim “tuṣyatu durjana iti nyāyaḥ.”  
Freschi states that “Corpses are not bodies, and after death, subjects will probably 
need some new form of (subtle?) body” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 152). This statement is 
apparently based on the fact that “bodies have been defined as the instrument for 
realizing experience,” and in this connection, Freschi has quoted Tantrarahasya of 
Rāmānujācārya, where body has been defined as “bhogasādhana”; i.e. the locus where 
the self experiences pleasure and pain. But almost the same definition of body has also 
been given in Mānameyodaya, a work on Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā by Nārāyaṇa (“tatra 
ātmabhogāyatanaṃśarīram” – Mānameyodaya edited by Swamī Yogīndrānanda, 
Varanasi, p.144). Now, Nārāyaṇa has also given some arguments for showing that the 
body is not the self, and the first one of them is that the qualities of the body are present 
so long as the body is existent, but the distinctive qualities of the self like cognition, 
pleasure, pain etc. are not present in the corpses [……ātmaviśeṣaguṇādīnāṃ 
śarīraguṇatvānupapatteh. yadi sukhaduḥkhādayaḥ śarīraviśeṣaguṇāḥ, tarhi te 
yāvaccharīram avatiṣṭheran, na hi te mṛtaśarīreṣūpalabhyante – Ibid,188]. Besides, 
this definition has been borrowed from Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyayāna (tatrātmā sarvasya 
bhoktā …….tasya bhogāyatanaṃ śarīram –Nyāyabhāṣya 1.1.9), which shows that this 
definition of body is acceptable to the Nyāya system, as well as to Rāmānujācārya. Yet, 
in verse no. 48 of the Nyāya text Bhāṣāpariccheda, it has been argued that 
consciousness is not a property of the body, since it is absent in corpses (śarīrasya na 
caitanyaṃ mṛteṣu vyabhicārataḥ). That corpses can be treated as bodies is also 
supported by the employment of the expression “mṛtaśarīrāṇām” in the commentary 
Siddhāntamuktāvalī on this verse. 
In footnote no. 34, there is the following statement: “……..the Buddhist 
pramāṇavāda (notwithstanding what seems a mechanistic account of causality) is not 
deterministic, as shown by the fact that Dharmakīrti refutes the possibility of inferring 
a result from its causes, so that even a karmic cause cannot be said to invariably lead 
to a certain result.” We need not contest here the claim that the Buddhist pramāṇavāda 
is not deterministic, but what has been said here about Dharmakīrti seems to be 
problematic. It is true that for Dharmakīrti, while one may infer the cause (say fire) of 
an effect (say, smoke) from the presence of that effect, the reverse is not true, because 
there may be the absence of the other causal factors that are necessary for producing 
that effect, or there may be some obstructive factor (pratibandhaka) which can prevent 
the production of that effect. But in the presence of kāraṇasāmagrī of some effect (i.e. 
the collection of all the necessary and sufficient conditions for the production of that 
specific effect, which also includes the absence of any preventive factor), the effect is 
bound to be produced. That Dharmakīrti would accept this position is clear from his 
statement in Pramānavārttika verse no. 3.53 that no effect can be produced by a single 
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causal factor; and that all effectuation is due to the presence of the collection of all the 
relevant causal factors (na kiñcidekamekasmāt sāmagryā sarvasambhavaḥ). Hence, if 
the words ‘causes’ that has been employed here by Freschi stands for the sumtotal of 
causal factors (kāraṇasāmagrī), then the effect cannot but be produced; otherwise, the 
very definition of cause as the invariable antecedent of the relevant effect would have 
to be rejected. (As Uddyotakara and Jayanta have pointed out, even though one cannot 
infer rain from a mere cloud; one can do so in the case of a dense and dark rain-cloud, 
that is accompanied by lightning and rumbling sound.) 
 An interesting issue arises in connection with Freschi's statement that, “For 
Mīmāṃsā authors, desire is part of the natural world, which is governed by the laws of 
karma and restricted by the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions…… An evidence of 
this attitude is found in discussions concerning the Parisaṅkhyāvidhi, pañca 
pañcanakhā bhaktavyāḥ “the five five-nailed ones are to be eaten.” The 
Parisaṅkhyāvidhi is a prescription restricting something else. In this case, Mīmāṃsā 
authors explain, it restricts one’s natural appetite – which would be directed to 
everything – to these five animals only” (Emphasis added) (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 155). 
Here, a few points should be noted. First, the word ‘bhaktavyāḥ’ is a typo – the correct 
form being ‘bhoktavyāḥ’. Second, the said prohibitory sentence in its exact form cannot 
be found in the extent Vedic corpus, though a sentence similar to it is present in 
Vālmikīrāmāyaṇa, and a similar statement is found also in Manusaṃhitā, verse no. 
5.18. The relevant verse has been uttered by Bāli, the monkey-king and the brother of 
Sugrīva, a friend of Rāma. When Bāli was fighting with Sugrīva, Rāma, in order to 
ensure the victory of his friend, pierced Bāli from behind with his arrows. Rāma was 
accused by Bāli before his death for several improper acts. There was no prior enmity 
between Bāli and Rāma, and it was cowardly on the part of Rāma to attack Bāli from 
behind. Moreover, human beings kill wild animals for their skin, hair, bones and meat, 
but the skin, hair and bones of Bāli were considered to be impure, and his meat could 
not be eaten by Rāma since among the animals that have five nails on their feet, only 
five (viz. rabbit, porcupine, iguana, rhinoceros and tortoise) are fit to be eaten by 
brāhmins and kṣatriyas, and while Bāli was a five-nailed animal, he was not included 
in this group. The implication is that five-nailed animals other than the five mentioned 
in this list should not be eaten — this does not extend to a prohibition against all the 
other beasts and birds that are not five-nailed. The relevant verses of Vālmikīrāmāyaṇa 
are as follows: adhāryaṃ carma me sadbhī romāṇyasthi ca varjitam / abhakṣyāni ca 
māṃsāni tvadvidhairdharmacāribhiḥ // pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā brahmakṣatreṇa 
rāghava / śaśakaḥ śallakī godhā khaḍgī kūrmaśca pañcama // carma cāsthi ca me rāma 
na spṛśanti manīṣiṇaḥ / abhakṣyāni ca māṃsāni so’haṃ pañcanakho hataḥ // 
(Vālmikīrāmāyaṇa, Kiṣkindhyākāṇda, Verse no. 17.38-40).   
That the injunction “pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ” does not by implication prevent 
one from consuming the meat of creatures like deer; and also the meats of birds like 
partridge, peacock, wild cock etc., it can be established by adequate evidence from 
Vālmikīrāmāyaṇa itself. When Rāma, accompanied by Sītā and Lakṣmaṇa left 
Ayodhyā and came to a forest, Lakṣmaṇa was asked by Rāma to build a suitable hut, 
and then to kill a deer, so that the venison obtained thereby could be used as an offering 
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in the sacrifice for sanctifying that hut. Accordingly, Lakṣmaṇa killed a blackbuck, that 
was fit to be eaten, roasted its meat in fire, and this roasted meat was offered as oblation 
in the said sacrifice: tāṃ niṣṭhitāṃ baddhakaṭāṃ dṛṣṭvā rāma sudarśanām / 
śuśrūṣamāṇamekāgraṃ idaṃ vacanamavravīt // aiṇeyaṃ māṃsamāhṛtya sālāṃ 
yakṣyāmahe vayam / mṛgaṃ hatvānaya kṣipraṃ lakṣmaṇeha śubhekṣaṇa // .............. 
atha cikṣepa saumitriḥ samiddhe jātavedasi / sa lakṣmaṇaḥ kṛṣṇamṛgaṃ hatvā 
medhyaṃ pratāpavān // (Vālmikīrāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇda, Verse no. 65.21-22, and 
26) Moreover, when Bharata along with his ministers and soldiers came to 
Daṇḍakāraṇya in order to implore Rāma for returning to Ayodhyā; the sage Bharadvāja 
(at whose hermitage Bharata had met Rāma), by virtue of his supernatural powers, 
created for these soldiers lakes full of the intoxicating drink maireya, and heaps of 
roasted meats of deer, peacocks and cocks: vāpyo maireyapūrṇāśca 
mṛṣṭamāṃsacayairvṛtāḥ/ prataptair paiṭharaiścāpi mārgamāyūrakukkuṭaiḥ // 
(Vālmikīrāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇda, Verse no. 92.70). 
One possible source of Freschi’s view that the sentence “pañca pañcanakhā” etc. 
restricts one’s appetite only to the meat of the five creatures like rabbit etc., may be the 
following sentence in Paspaśāhnika of Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya–“ 
…..bhakṣyaniyamena abhakṣyapratiṣedho gamyate. ‘pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ’ 
ityukte gamyate etat – ‘ato’nye’ bhakṣyā’ iti”; the last part of which apparently means 
that all animals other than these five specified animals are unfit for consumption. But 
that this is not the case is clear from the commentary Rājalakṣmī on this sentence, viz. 
“pañcanakhāḥ – godhākūrmaprabhṛtayaḥ smṛtāvuktāḥ. ato’nye – pañcātiriktāḥ 
pañcanakhāḥ”, which means that the restriction concerned applies only to five-nailed 
animals like cats etc. that are other than rabbits etc. (Mahābhāṣya with several 
commentaries , edited by Guruprasad Shastri, Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, New Delhi, 
Vol.I, 39-40) This is further fortified by the next two sentences of Mahābhāṣya, viz. 
“abhakṣyapratiṣedhena vā bhakṣyaniyamaḥ, tadyathā – ‘abhakṣyo grāmyakukkuṭaḥ, 
abhaksyaḥ grāmyasūkaraḥ’ ityukte gamyata etat – ‘āraṇyo bhakṣya’ iti”; which states 
that from the prohibition ‘domesticated boars and domesticated cocks should not be 
eaten’, it follows that wild boars and wild cocks are fit to be eaten. Neither the boar nor 
the cock is five-nailed.  
The most explicit statement in this regard is found in Manusaṃhitā (verse no. 5.18), 
where in addition to the statement that among the five-nailed animals, only five (viz. 
rabbit etc.) are fit to be eaten, it is also stated that with the exception of camels, animals 
like goats, sheep, deer etc. that have only one row of teeth, are animals whose meat is 
fit to be eaten : śvāvidhaṃ śalyakaṃ godhāṃ khaḍgikūrmaśaśāṃstathā / bhakṣyān 
pañcanakheṣvāhuranuṣṭrāṅścaikatodataḥ //. Here also, animals like goats etc. do not 
belong to the group of five types of five-nailed animals. Besides, the import of the 
sentence ‘pañca pañcanakhāḥ’ etc. is not that eating the meat of these five types of 
animals is mandatory, because one who abhors the eating of meat as such may desist 
from eating the meat of these animals without violating the scriptures. (Manu has said 
quite categorically (verse no. 5.56) that while the eating of the meat that is fit for 
consumption is not censurable (na māṃsa- bhakṣaṇe doṣaḥ), desisting from eating 
meat produces great merit (nivṛttistu mahāphalā)). Thus the words “are to be eaten” in 
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the translation of Feschi are somewhat misleading — “may be eaten” or “are fit to be 
eaten” would be a better rendering, which would mean that the consumption of the 
meat of these animals is optional, and hence, not prohibited, and thus does not incur 
any sin that calls for expiation. 
 Freschi states that, “The Veda is an instrument of knowledge about what one ought 
to do, because it prescribes something to be done instead of describing a state of affairs. 
It is thus a collection of commands” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 157). While the Vedas 
contain a lot of commands, they contain also something else, some of them being 
descriptions. The Vedic sentences can be initially divided into two parts: (i) Mantras 
and (ii) Brāhmaṇas (mantrabrāhmaṇayor vedanāmadheyam), the second part also 
containing the sub-sections like Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads. The commands mentioned 
above are usually found in the Brāhmaṇa portion. Alternatively, the Vedic sentences 
may be divided into five groups: (i) mantra (the hymns to be recited at rituals); (ii) 
vidhi (injunctions or instructions about what is to be done); (iii) niṣedha (prohibitions, 
i.e. instructions about what is to be avoided); (iv) arthavāda (sentences that are either 
laudatory i.e. statements that praise the recommended action, or deprecatory i.e. 
statements that denigrate the actions that are prohibited); and (v) nāmadheya (sentences 
that state the names of rituals). (Some authors have treated prohibitions as negative 
injunctions, and included them under commands; but authors like Śomeśvara Bhaṭṭa 
have pointed out in works like Nyāyasudhā, a commentary on the Tantravārttika of 
Kumārila, the basic distinctions between vidhi and niṣedha.) Again, in Nyāyasūtra 
2.1.64, arthavāda-s have been divided into four groups: (i)stuti; (ii) nindā,;(iii) parakṛti 
;and (iv) purākalpa. The first and second of these are respectively the laudatory and 
denigratory statements mentioned earlier, the third one states how a certain group of 
priests perform the prescribed ritual in a different manner, and the fourth one states 
how the prescribed action is being performed from ancient times. Many of the 
Upaniṣads contain a number of stories, where one finds a lot of sentences that are not 
injunctive or prescriptive in nature. Thus, it is not proper to say that the Vedas are only 
collections of commands. It is, however, a fact that according to both the sub-schools 
of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, sentences like mantra, arthavāda, nāmadheya etc. are significant 
only in so far as they can be connected in some way or other to some prescriptions or 
prohibitions (vidhinā tvekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhīnāṃ syuḥ – Mīmāṃsāsūtra 
1.2.7).  
Freschi says that, “Given that the Veda is the only source of morality, one might 
expect the Veda to prescribe only rituals having objectives that are clearly acceptable, 
such as sons and cattle, and that it would avoid prescribing rituals where results run 
against the very Vedic rules. In fact, since the Veda….. is the only source of ethical 
norms, how can it prescribe one to do something which it prohibits elsewhere?" 
(emphasis added) (Dasti & Bryant 2014,  158-159). After raising this question, Freschi 
has shown how the Vedic injunction “śyenena abhicaran yajeta” (Ṣaḍviṃśabrāhmaṇa 
4.2.1.1) cannot be treated as an example of the Veda commanding one to do something 
morally reprehensible, even though the śyena sacrifice is supposed to result in the death 
of some enemy of the beneficiary of that sacrifice. This injunction is supposed to be 
incompatible with the prohibition “one should not cause any harm to any living being” 
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(na hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtāni), which cannot, however, be found in any extant Vedic text. 
Freschi provides the standard answer given here in the texts of Pūrva -Mīmāṃsā. Here, 
two things are to be noted. The first is that according to the texts of Dharmaśāstra, there 
are various sources from which one can know what is moral, and what is immoral, the 
Vedas being only one of such sources, even though it has the highest authority in 
matters regarding dharma and adharma. Apart from the Vedas, the Smṛti texts, the 
conduct of people conversant with the Vedas, the practices of honest persons, and one’s 
own conscience (or self-satisfaction unaccompanied by a sense of guilt or remorse) can 
also be such sources. The following two verses from Manusaṃhitā and 
Yājñavalkyasaṃhitā mention these sources: (i) vedo’khilo dharmamūlaṃ smṛtiśīle ca 
tadvidām/ ācāraścaiva sādhūnāmātmanastuṣṭireva ca // (Manusaṃhitā 2.6); (ii) śrutiḥ 
smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyamātmanaḥ / samyaksaṃkalpajo kāmo 
dharmamūlamidaṃ smṛtaṃ // (Yājñavalkyasaṃhitā 1.7). Such Smṛti passages contain 
an echo of the following words of Taittirīiyopaniṣad 1.11.2-4: yānyavadyāni karmāṇi. 
tāni sevitavyāni. no itarāṇi. yānyasmākaṃ sucaritāni. tani tvayopāsyāni. no 
itarāṇi…………. atha yadi te karmavicikitsā vā vṛttavicikitsā vā syāt. ye tatra yuktā 
āyuktāḥ. alūkṣā dharmakāmāḥ syuḥ. yathā te tatra varteran. tathā tatra vartethāḥ 
(“Whatever deeds are blameless, they are to be practiced, not others. Whatever good 
practices there are among us, they are to be adopted by you, not others….. Then, if 
there be in you any doubt regarding any deeds, any doubt regarding conduct, you 
should behave yourself in such matters, as the Brāhmanas there, who are competent to 
judge, devoted to good deeds, not led by others, not harsh, lovers of virtue, would 
behave in such cases.”) (translation by S. Radhakrishnan). So far as the prohibition “na 
hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtāni” is concerned, one can find such a prohibition in a modified 
manner in Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.15.1 (“ahiṃsan sarvabhūtāni anyatra tīrthebhyaḥ”), 
which prohibits the killing of animals, with the exceptions of the killings involved in 
sacrifices. Besides, in some editions of the Mahābhārata, the line “na hiṃsyāt” etc. 
occurs in Vanaparvan (212.34.37).  
Timalsina. The paper by Timalsina justifiably emphasizes the fact that “the 
historical context in which the issue of agency emerges in Advaita is different from the 
contemporary discourse on agency and free will” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 187), even 
though there may be some similarity between the arguments employed in those two 
traditions. The first reason thereof is the fact that the Advaita Vedāntins admit the law 
of karma, even though for them it does not entail the lack of agency on the part of the 
individual. Consequently, “whether the events experienced in this life are the 
consequences of past actions, or are determined by a free will acting in the present time 
is a complex issue” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 187). Besides, like the Mādhyamika 
Buddhists, “Śaṅkara also describes reality in two tiers, consisting of the conventional 
(vyavahārika) reality that corresponds to our phenomenal experiences, and the absolute 
(pāramārthika) reality of Brahman” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 188), and that the issue of 
agency arises only at the level of phenomenal reality. But Śaṅkara “rejects the paradigm 
of agent and action when postulating the absolute viewpoint…….his is not a case of 
either free will or determinism: it is a compromise between free will and a mild 
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determinism that is based on the karmic residue of an agent’s previous actions that were 
affected with his own free will” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 188).  
There are, however, some remarks in this paper which may be disputed. Thus, 
Timalsina says, “Similar to the Mādhyamika Buddhists ……Śaṅkara adopts the model 
of describing reality in two tiers, consisting of the conventional (vyāvahārika) reality 
that corresponds to our phenomenal experiences and the absolute (pāramārthika) 
reality of the Brahman” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 188). Here, it may be noted that while 
vyāvahārika sattā or empirical /conventional reality is accorded to objects of our 
experience that are sublated or cancelled by the direct experience (aparokṣānubhūti) of 
Brahman, and absolute reality (pāramārthika sattā) is admitted in the case of Brahman, 
a third type of reality, known as prātibhāsika sattā is accepted by Advaita Vedāntins 
in the case of illusory objects. These are not fictional like sky-flower, since they are 
experienced, and they subsist only during their appearance (pratibhāsa). 
 Timalsina says, “Śaṅkara maintains that the wisdom imparted by the Upaniṣadic 
sentences such as “you are that” suffices to grant liberation independent of performing 
rituals or any actions for that matter” (Dasti & Bryant 2014,189). While it is true that 
such a view is acceptable for the adherents of the Vivaraṇa school, i.e. those who admit 
the views of Prakāśātmayati, which admits the possibility of such ‘great 
sentences’(mahāvākyas) producing direct awareness (aparokṣānubhava) of the self in 
its pure nature, this view is not admitted by Vācaspati Miśra, for whom the purified 
mind (manas/antaḥkaraṇa) produces the immediate knowledge of self, and the 
followers of Maṇḍana Miśra like Vidyāraṇya Muni admit that the real nature of self is 
grasped through contemplative practices that are known as nididhyāsana or 
prasaṃkhyāna. Thus it is a bit difficult to determine the exact view of Śaṅkara in this 
matter. This entire debate arises out of the interpretation of the statement in 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad that ‘one should ‘see’ the self by means of hearing, 
ratiocination and contemplation” (ātmā vāre drasṭavyaḥ śrotāvyo mantavyo 
nididhyāsitavyah” (2.4.5, 4.5.6)), and an unidentified Smṛti verse “śrotavyaḥ 
śrutivākyabhyaḥ mantavyaścopapathibhih / matvā ca satataṃ dhyeya ete 
darśanahetavaḥ”. Besides, the purified mind and contemplative practice have been said 
to result in the direct awareness of self in Upaniṣadic passages like “eṣo’ṇuratma cetasā 
veditavyaḥ (Muṇḍaka Up.3.1.9); “eṣa sarveṣu bhuteṣu gūḍho ātmā na prakāśate / 
dṛśyate tvagryayā buddhyā sūkṣmayā sūkṣma-darśibhiḥ” (Kaṭha Up.1.3.12) “te 
dhyānayogānugatā apaśyan devātmaśaktiṃ svagunairni-gūḍhām.”(Śvetāśvatara 
Up.1.3); “adhyātmayogādhigamena devaṃ matvā dhīro harṣaśokau jahāti” (Kaṭha 
Up.1.2.12) etc. Timalsina has not stated where these alternative doctrines have been 
clearly rejected by Śaṅkara. In fact, Vācaspati Miśra has quoted a sentence from 
Śaṅkara’s Gitābhāṣya in favour of his view. 
 Timalsina says, “What exists in reality is just Brahman or the self. This self, due 
to forgetting its real nature, imagines itself both as agent and effects: The phenomenal 
world, or the reality as we see it, is the creation or imagination of the self” (Dasti & 
Bryant 2014, 189). This virtually equates the doctrine of Advaita Vedānta with the view 
known as Dṛṣṭisṛṣtivāda, where the individual self is said to be the creator of the world 
inhabited by it. Even though Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has admitted that this view is the 
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principal doctrine of Advaita Vedānta, Timalsina has not given any evidence in favour 
of the view that this has been admitted by Śaṅkara.  
Timalsina says, “Advaita maintains that Brahman and the phenomenal self are 
identical in essence. This being the case, if there were any creation, the phenomenal 
self could then be considered the autonomous personal creator of the world…… To 
prevent this conclusion, Śaṅkara responds that the Brahman transcends individuality 
because it is eternally pure, and always in the state of liberation…… One can further 
argue that the self is the creator with regard to the person who has realized the identity 
of the self and the Brahman, Śaṅkara counter argues, “in that state, what is creation 
[there?]” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 194-195). Here, one should also notice that Śaṅkara 
has also composed a small work entitled Pañcīkaraṇa, where he has described how the 
gross objects of this world are made from avidyā through a process of quintuplication. 
The text has been commented on by Sureśvara, a direct disciple of Śaṅkara, and hence 
this work cannot be treated as spurious. It seems to us that in such cases one should 
state that for Śaṅkara, the process of creation pertains to entities that have only 
empirical or phenomenal reality (vyāvahārika sattā), but not absolute reality 
(pāramārthika sattā). Again, we find the following sentence: “Furthermore, the agency 
imposed upon the self is not permanent, as one can see its absence in the deep sleep 
state, and if the self were composed of impermanent properties, this would lead to the 
impermanence of the self.” (emphasis added) (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 200). What is said 
here is true to a certain extent. Thus, a cloth that is composed of (or constituted by) a 
number of impermanent threads is also impermanent. But nobody treats agency etc. as 
components of the self, or as properties of which the self is composed. One may say 
that agency etc. are not components of the self, but they are properties that belong to 
the self; and in that case, the self may be permanent, even though some of its properties 
may be impermanent; just as Prakṛti admitted in the Saṃkhya system is eternal or 
permanent, although the properties that it acquires through transformations are 
impermanent.  
Finally, Timalsina says, “According to Sureśvara, the very Brahman when 
conditioned by avidyā assumes the collective subjectivity of Īśvara, and when 
conditioned by buddhi becomes the phenomenal self" (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 204). This 
position, however, is not acceptable to many other Advaitins. Sarvajñātman (1027 CE) 
for instance, rejects the idea that Īśvara is pure consciousness delimited by avidyā. Pure 
consciousness, for him, is like the surface, where what is reflected due to avidyā is 
Īśvara.” The last sentence of this passage is incorrect. For Sarvajñātman, both Īśvara 
and jīva (i.e. individual self) are reflections (pratibimbas) of pure consciousness. Their 
distinction being due to the fact that while Īśvara is the reflection of pure consciousness 
in avidyā (avidyāpratibimbitacaitanya), jīva is reflection of pure consciousness in the 
internal organ (antaḥkaraṇapra-tibimbitacaitanya). This has been stated clearly in the 
following verse of Saṃkṣepaśārīraka by Sarvajñātman: sukṛtaduṣkṛtakarmaṇi 
kartṛtāṃ matigatātmaciti-pratibimbakam / vrajati tadvadadaḥ paramātmano jagati 
yāti tamaḥpratibimbakam // (1/327) That according to Sarvajñātman both jīva and 
Īśvara are reflections in intellect /internal organ and avidyā respectively is clear from 
the following lines of Sārasaṃgraha, Madhusūdana’s commentary on the verse quoted 
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above: “yathā puṇyapāpayor jīvabhāvamāpannam antaḥkaraṇe pratibimbacaitanyam 
eva kartṛ, ‘kartā śāstrārthavattvād’iti nyāyat. na tacchabalam iti mantavyam, 
tadvajjagato’pi tamaḥpratibimbakaṃ caitanyameveśvarābhidhānaṃ kartṛ bhavati, na 
tamoviśiṣṭam ityarthaḥ.” That Sarvajñātman has used here the word ‘tamas’ in the 
sense of avidyā, is clear from Saṃkṣepaśārīraka, verse nos. 1/318, 1/319 and the 
commentaries on them.  
                                              *           *                      * 
To conclude, as said before, this anthology succeeds in providing the reader with many 
well-written and illuminating accounts of the views of twelve Indian schools about free 
will, agency and selfhood. It is a very valuable contribution to the contemporary 
discussion of these problems across cultures. 
 
 
 
 
